Lord Tyler asked Her Majesty's Government: What details the Civil Aviation Authority holds in relation to the following contaminated air incidents that occurred on the following dates to Bombardier Dash 8 Q-400 aircraft: G-JEDP of 10th February 2005; G-JEDP of 11th February 2005; and G-JEDO of 2nd April 2005. [HL4095]
Lord Davies of Oldham: The details the CAA has are as follows:
This incident was investigated by the AAIB (AAIB Bulletin 11/2005, ref: EW/G2005/20/05). A summary, from the AAIB bulletin is as follows:
As the aircraft commenced its take off run, the take off warning horn sounded. The take off was rejected, but while taxiing for another attempt, the pilots noticed a burning smell on the flight deck. When advised by the cabin crew that there was also a smell of burning and some smoke in the cabin, the commander stopped the aircraft on the taxiway and initiated an expeditious disembarkation using the forward passenger door only. An engineering investigation carried out by the operator's maintenance personnel and the engine manufacturer found that a piece of the right hand engine compressor inner support had become detached, causing damage to a compressor oil seal and allowing oil to contaminate the engine bleed air. The engine manufacturer is aware of the issues and is addressing them through component re-design and engine modifications.
This event is connected with the occurrence of the 10 February 2005 and is also covered by AAIB Bulletin 11/2005, ref: EW/G2005/20/05.
The CAA has the following information:
Climbing through FL130, the nr1 cabin attendant reported an acrid plastic smell from the forward cabin air vent situated in the roof by the emergency exit sign. The nr3 cabin attendant confirmed the smell. There were no fumes in the flight deck (the air vent was closed and the flight deck door was kept shut). Emergency Check List actioned and aircraft returned. An uneventful approach, landing and taxi to stand were carried out with AFS (company) in attendance. AFS and engineering inspection carried out. Nr1 and nr3 advised of feeling sick with a taste in their throat and were taken to hospital for a check up. Engineering investigation failed to reveal any faults or evidence of overheating, either within the galley area, where fumes were noted, or with the compressor section of the engines. However, it was noted nr1 water heater was found to be hotter to touch than the adjacent urn, with a distinct odour from the seal. Urn removed from the aircraft as a precaution and the aircraft returned to service. After initial observations and before the aircraft was released to service, both engines were inspected by borescope. No recurrence to date. The most probable cause was degradation of the urn seal.
1 March 2006